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Abstract
Cybersecurity is an important strategic areas of computer science, and a difficult discipline to
teach effectively. To enhance and provide effective teaching and meaningful learning, we develop
and assess two pedagogical tools: Peer instruction, and Concept Maps. Peer instruction teaching
methodology has shown promising results in core computer science courses by reducing failure rates
and improving student retention in computer science major. Concept maps are well-known tech-
nique for improving student-learning experience in class. This thesis document presents the results
of implementing and evaluating the peer instruction in a semester-long cybersecurity course, i.e.,
introduction to computer security. Development and evaluation of concept maps for two cyberse-
curity courses: SCADA security systems, and digital forensics. We assess the quality of the concept
maps using two well-defined techniques: Waterloo rubric, and topological scoring. Results clearly
shows that overall concept maps are of high-quality and there is significant improvement in student
learning gain during group-discussion.
Keywords: Concept Maps, Peer Instruction, Cybersecurity, Computer Science,
Development, Assessment
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Cybersecurity is an important strategic areas of Computer Science, and also a difficult discipline
to teach effectively. Unfortunately, not much effort has been made to develop course curriculum
and instructional material to teach cybersecurity effectively. The goal of this thesis document is to
assess the effectiveness of two well-known pedagogical methods/tools for cybersecurity courses i.e.,
concept maps, and peer instruction.
1.1 Concept Map
In this work we focus on conceptual mapping, which is a well-known pedagogical technique for
enhancing students learning and understanding of the concepts [9]. It is graphical tool used by
people from many ages which makes easy for one to draw and express their understanding about
the topic using the concept map. A concept-map consists of an interconnected elements and sub-
elements of a concept, showing a holistic big picture of an overall concept. It is useful to trigger
student’s active engagement process. In Particular we have developed concept maps for SCADA
system security and digital forensics investigation. Having deep conceptual understanding is very
important to flourish in these courses. This maps can help the students from diverse background
of computer science and engineering to attain in-depth conceptual understanding of about the
challenges, issues and solutions of SCADA security and basic foundation for digital evidences and
investigation along with varies types of tools and techniques of investigation. To support the use of
conceptual mapping in SCADA security and digital forensics class, we develop 22 concept maps for
a SCADA security and 19 concept maps for digital forensics course covering different topics from
basic to advance levels.
Furthermore, this document assesses the quality of the concept maps using two techniques. A
concept maps assessment rubric developed by the University of Waterloo [2] and taxonomy topo-
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logical measure defined in Cmapanalysis tool [8]. The rubric suggests to evaluate five elements of
a concept map i.e. breadth of net, interconnectedness, use of descriptive links, efficient links,layout
and development over the time. It also suggests to assess these elements at four levels i.e. Excellent,
Good, Poor, and Fail. Topological taxonomy features suggests the evaluation on the structure of
concept map i.e, Branch point count, Average words per concept, concept count, linking phrase, or-
phan count, proposition count, Root child count, sub map count. Based on these above mentioned
parameters it gives the taxonomy score of the concept map.
1.2 Peer Instruction
Peer instruction is a well-defined teaching protocol designed for active engagement of students in
class [6,32]. It involves conceptual multiple-choice questions and group discussion activities aimed
to provoke deep conceptual thinking in students. Peer instruction may be effective in dealing with
the challenges of cybersecurity education including encouraging out-of-box thinking, developing a
mindset of both attacker and defender, and attaining a deep working knowledge of the state-of
the art cybersecurity tools and techniques. Inspired by the success of peer instruction in computer
science courses, we implement and evaluate peer instruction in a semester-long cybersecurity course,
introduction to computer security. Peer instruction requires the students to read lecture material
before coming to class. It then, utilizes the acquired knowledge of the students (from the reading)
via preplanned conceptual questions to trigger the thinking process in class on a target concept.
In a peer instruction classroom, lecture is organized into a set of multiple choice questions. To
discuss a concept, instructor first asks a question and then, let the students reply the questions
individually followed by a discussion in small groups to resolve any discrepancies in the answers.
For this research, we gather the data over three semesters (Fall 2015, Fall 2016 and Fall 2017)
consisting of quizzes, subjective exams, peer instruction questions and surveys. The first two
semesters are based on traditional lectures while in the latter semester, the course is revised to
incorporate peer instruction methodology. This thesis document presents the evaluation results
of the implementation and compares them with traditional lecture-centric approach. The peer
instruction is evaluated in terms of dropout and failure rates, student learning gain during the group
discussion, and survey on students’ experience and usage of clickers. The research shows that peer
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instruction helps the students in achieving 6% higher grades in final exams than traditional lecture-
centric approach. It reduces the failure rate by 61% on average in four core computer science courses
(i.e., CS1, CS1.5, Theory of Computation, and Computer Architecture) and improving the student
retention in computer science major by 31%. The evaluation results show that peer instruction
improves the dropout rate for the undergraduate students by 6% and 16% and the failure rate by
44% and 37% when compared with traditional lecture classes of two semesters respectively. The
survey results show that 77% students find the group discussion with fellow students useful to
understand the computer security concepts. 70% students would recommend peer instruction be
adopted by other instructors.
We have made the concept maps publicly available at gitlab [12]. As the result of this thesis
work two papers were published at SIGSCE’19-The 50th ACM Technical Symposium on Computer
Science Education conference. Evaluation of Peer Instruction for Cybersecurity Education [14] and
Topological Scoring of Concept Maps for Cybersecurity Education [13].
Organization of the Thesis Document Thesis document presents two different works in cyber-
security education. Section 2 discuss the related work on cybersecurity courses and works done on
peer instructions and concept maps. Section 3 presents the development and analysis techniques
and results on concept maps. Section 4 presents the evaluation methods and evaluation results of
peer instruction. Section 5 concludes the thesis document.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Concept Map
Novak’s el.al( [24], [22], [23] )research group at Cornell University first developed concept maps
in 1972 in a research project that sought to follow changes in children’s understanding of basic
science concepts after audio-tutorial instruction in Grades 1 and 2, and continuing through Grade
12. Concept maps were developed to effective improve learning in science. Concept mapping has
been shown to be an effective tool for learning at all levels,from preschool to graduate school and
corporate training.
Novak et.al [9]in there research work they have presented the theoretical foundation of concept
maps. They have explained the importance of the concept maps by providing detailed understand-
ing of node and linking phrases to be used. Concept maps are been used world wide and allows
learner to organization there thoughts, represent there ideas and knowledge about the topic. Fur-
ther it also discuss about how it helps instructor to organize the topic and make it easy for students
to understand. Thesis document also discuss about how one should construct and use the concept
maps.
Instructors grade the students understanding by looking at the concept map developed by them.
There are different techniques and challenges in assessing the maps developed.
One method suggested by Novak and Gowin [2] is based on components and structure of cmap.
Assessing the map is as follows: valid propositions(1 point each), level of hierarchy(5 points of each
level),number of branching(1 point for each branch), cross links(10 points for each cross links), and
specific examples (1 point for each example). Here we can see map is graded based on the structure
students could develop maps with huge structure but without addressing any conceptual ideas but
yet can score good. Addressing the validity and reliability of score became a key issue.
Chen-Chung Liu et.al [20] developed a technique to assess the concept map based on the con-
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cept included in map a research have suggested assessment based on linkage patterns in concept
maps where they propose analytics algorithms for discovering three linkage patterns: Confused
concepts,substitute concepts for misconceptions and hidden wrong concept. In this assessment
method students concept maps are compared with the experts concept maps for evaluation. Every
individual have different way of organizing the knowledge about the specif topics and thus some-
times its difficult to for instructor to assess the maps. The two technologies which we have used to
assessment our maps developed are explained further.
Norma L. Miller et.al [21] have developed a semantic scoring rubric for concept maps. This
rubric can be applied only to the maps that contains some semantic and structural elements to
be read meaningfully i.e., concept map with level 3 or greater can be assessed using this scoring
method. This method take six criteria: concept relevance and completeness, correct propositional
structure, presence of erroneous propositions (misconceptions), presence of dynamic propositions,
number and quality of cross-links, and presence of cycles.
Alberto J. Can˜as et.al and team have a created a cmapanalysis tool for assessing the quality
of cmap. They have created a software tool with different types of measurement techniques. This
tool measures size, quality and structural evaluation. It is a extensible tool where user can add the
measure or techniques they want to use to assess the cmap. Basic Cmap info,Topological Taxonomy
Measures, Centrality Measures, Cluster Measures.
Alejandro et.al [34] have created a automatic topological taxonomy feature which is used in
above explained cmapanalysis tool. This feature classifies the cmaps in 6 level and give results for
the structural complexity of the cmap. This Measure uses five description features: the existence
of hierarchical structure, size of concept labels, presence of linking phrases, number of branching
points, and number of cross links.
2.2 Peer Instruction
Peer instruction is widely adopted and studied in many science disciplines. This section limits the
scope to the pertinent efforts on the evaluation of peer instruction.
Crouch et. al [11] implement peer instruction methodology on calculus and algebra and present
the results of past ten years. They made improvements in implementing the peer instructions such
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as replacing class quiz with asking students to read the before-class material and provide a write
up in the class.
Rao et.al [28] used peer instruction in medical physiology class comprised of 256 first-year
medical students. Their implementation is limited to 10 classes. The duration of each class is 50
minutes. Motivation of this research was to improve students performance in quiz by using peer
instruction methodology. They used a multiple-choice quiz question followed by class presentation
and then, quantified the results. They noticed a significant increase of the percentage of correct
answers.
Ronald et al. [10] attempted to test the hypothesis that peer instruction enhanced meaningful
learning and the student’s ability to solve novel problems or the ability to apply the knowledge to
different new and existing contexts. They divided a class of 38 undergraduate students into two
groups, referred to as group A and group B. The effectivenesses of peer instruction methodology
was observed in two exam categories: quiz and problem solving. The group A students followed the
peer instruction methodology and were given one-minute time for the group discussions with peer
students. The group B students were not allowed to discuss the questions. Their study concluded
that peer instruction helped the students in understanding the original material.
Simon et. al [33] applied peer instruction methodology to introductory computer science courses.
They did not fully-adopt the methodology and deviated from the standard model in some aspects.
For instance, textbook reading was assigned before each class and avoided mini lectures before
the peer instruction questions and class quizzes. Their evaluation results on quiz and problem
solving showed that on average, the correct answers were improved by 21% and 19% after the
group discussions respectively.
Johnson et. al [16, 17] developed 108 peer instruction questions for digital forensics course and
used a subset of these questions in a four-hour long workshop to evaluate the peer instruction
methodology. The workshop was attended by 12 participants and covered three digital forensic
topics: file system, file carving, and MS Windows registry. Their evaluation results showed the
learning gain via quiz and clicker questions by 34% and 13% respectively.
Porteret. al [25] present a study on students’ failure rate on the data of past 10 years for four
computer science courses. Their findings concluded that on average, peer instruction reduced the
failure rate by 61% as compared to the Standard lecture-based teaching approach. In particular,
6
when an instructor teaching the same course using peer instruction, the failure rate reduced by
65%, on average.
Esper et. al [15] adopted peer instruction in a software engineering course that had 189 students.
They made slight modification in the standard peer instruction methodology. A clicker question is
initially shown without answers and then, the instructor asks the students to call out suggestions for
the answers. Both the students and instructor proposed a potential answer choices with discussions
of those answers. Their survey results showed that 28% students would not recommend peer
instruction for teaching because correct answers are not given and clicker questions are not clear.
Daniel it el.al [35] examined the effectiveness of peer instruction in two upper-level computer
science courses: Theory of Computation, and Computer Architecture. Their evaluation results
found the learning gain of 39% in peer instruction classes.
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Chapter 3
Assessment And Development Of
Concept Maps
3.1 Developing a Concept Map
Overview Concept maps are a visual tool for organizing and representing knowledge. They
include concepts, represented as text boxes, and relationships between pairs of concepts indicated by
a connecting link. The most abstract concepts are placed at the top the diagram, while progressively
more specific ones are placed underneath them. This simple design allows seamless and effective
linking and exploration of concept at different levels of detail. There are many different tools
used to create a concept map, the one which we have used is CMap tools. The CMap tools is
a software developed at the institute of humans and machine cognition. Computer-based concept
mapping software such as CmapTools have further extended the use of concept mapping and greatly
enhanced the potential of the tool, facilitating the implementation of a concept map-centered
learning environment [9].
3.1.1 Cybersecurity Courses
SCADA System Security Supervisor Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems control
major portions of the U.S. critical infrastructure power grid, pipe-lines, water management, etc.
and protecting their integrity and availability is of primary importance to national security [5].
Therefore, it is crucial for cybersecurity professionals at-large to have deep conceptual understand-
ing of SCADA security.
SCADA systems are challenging for cybersecurity education because of its interdisciplinary na-
ture and diverse set of applications involving large number of communication protocols, software,
and embedded devices [3, 4, 7, 18, 30, 31]. Unfortunately, not much effort has been made to de-
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velop course curriculum and instructional material to teach the cybersecurity of SCADA systems
effectively.
We develop the concept maps for SCADA system security that can help the students from diverse
background of computer science and engineering to attain in-depth conceptual understanding of
the challenges, issues and solutions of SCADA security.
Digital Forensics Digital forensics is a challenging discipline to teach effectively because of
its inter disciplinary nature. It is defined as the application of scientific tools and methods to
identify, collect, and analyze digital artifacts in support of legal proceedings [29]. Students need to
accomplish a reasonable critical thinking and understanding of doing digital investigation because
they need to have clear understanding of rules and regulations set forth by state and government
law [16]. To effective teach digital forensics instructor requires many different practical exercise
and examples tasks in class which provokes students with thought-processes and systematically
engaging them in problem-solving during class.
3.1.2 Steps to Create a Concept Map
We use the following systematic approach to develop the concept maps for SCADA security and
digital forensics course.
1. Select a target concept.
2. Identify keywords that represent some aspect of the concept.
3. Recognize any relationships among the keywords in appropriate words and phrases and then,
4. Draw the concept map; circle the keywords and connect them with the relationship word-
s/phrases.
Guidelines of Do’s and Don’ts From our experience of developing and improving concept
maps including several revisions, and reviews and comments from other participants, we develop a
guideline list of Do’s and Don’ts while developing a concept map.
• A connection between two nodes should be unidirectional.
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• A connecting phrase should describe the relationship between two nodes clearly. Otherwise,
avoid such connections and elaborate them with additional keyword(s) between them.
• A connecting loop across one or multiple nodes tend to create confusion and should be avoided.
3.2 Examples of Concept Maps
3.2.1 Concept Maps on SCADA systems
This section presents three examples of concept maps covering three distinct concepts i.e. differences
between SCADA and DCS, working of conveyor belt, and attacks on Modbus protocol.
Difference between SCADA and DCS:
SCADA systems are used for a large-scale geographical dispersed physical processes, where as DCS
are used to control and monitor the physical processes on a small geographical areas or even single
sites.
Steps to develop the Concept Map: Figure 3.1 shows the concept map on the differences between
SCADA and DCS (distributed control system). The map consists of four levels of hierarchy, and
mostly uses one word to link two nodes. Nodes are self descriptive and mostly contain one or two
words. To develop this map, we use our systematic approach as follows:
• We identify the target concept of distinguishing SCADA from DCS.
• We come up with the keywords such as demographic size, reliability/data quality, paradigm,
unit design and power consumption as a differentiating parameter between SCADA and DCS.
• The essential connecting words that we used in the map was SCADA and DCS as it connects
keywords such as demographic size and what is size if it is a SCADA or DCS.
Working of ICS components: conveyor belt:
The main components of a typical conveyor belt are drivers, actuators, controllers, monitors and
sensors. Programmable logic controller (PLC) receives an input signal from proximity sensor that
10
Figure 3.1: Concept map: Differences between SCADA and DCS system
shows that an object is placed on the belt. The PLC runs its control logic and sends an output
signal to servo drive to move the conveyor belt to make some space for the next object. The whole
conveyor belt physical process can be remotely monitored by using HMI and the data received by
the HMI is also stored in historian. There are two types of sensors proximity sensor and photo
eye sensor, which detects the presence of the object using beam of light and electromagnetic field
respectively.
Steps to develop the Concept Map: Figure 3.2 shows the concept map on the working and
components of a conveyor belt. The map consists of four levels of hierarchy, and mostly uses
succinct phrases to link two nodes. Nodes are also using short descriptive phrases or long words.
To develop this map, we use our systematic approach as follows:
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Figure 3.2: Working of ICS: Conveyor Belt example
• The target concept addresses a typical working model of conveyor belt including its compo-
nents.
• We select the keywords including components, sensors and actuators used and how it was
used.
• To connect the nodes that can make sufficient understanding of their relationships, we mostly
use phrases, instead of words.
Function codes in MODBUS protocol:
MODBUS is an open communication protocol used for transmitting information between electronic
devices. It has various data files and programs files used for reading transmitting data. To read
12
Figure 3.3: Function codes used in MODBUS protocol
transmitted data, we require the use of function codes. Each data file has a function code assigned
to read or to write from the concerned data file.
Steps to develop the Concept Map: Figure 3.3 shows concept map explaining function codes of
MODBUS protocols. The map consists of four levels of hierarchy. The nodes and connecting links
mostly use succinct phrases. To develop this map, we use our systematic approach as follows:
• The target concept is the concept of function codes in MODBUS protocol.
• Keywords are identified Read coil status, Read holding registers and other function codes.
• The connecting words include number of code and what it “indicates” and “message ex-
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change”.
Real life Attacks on SCADA systems :
There are many different of types of attacks possible on industrial control systems. Students must
be aware of these attacks types, causes, consequence and should learn how to prevent or over come
some of these attacks. This map shows different categories of attacks and examples of real life
incidental. For instance consider the attack which is caused due to delayed SCADA response or
where attacker disables the systems and stops systems from reacting. One such example of these
attack incident is maroochy waster water attack where attacker steals the equipment, issues radio
commands and disable alarms. Consequence was sewage water spillage into local parks and rivers
causing environmental damage.
Steps to develop the Concept Map: Figure 3.4 shows concept map explanation different
categorizes of real life attack incident on SCADA systems. The map consists of five level of hierarchy
nodes and connecting links are self explanatory words. To develop this map, we use our systematic
approach as follows:
• The target concept is the concept of providing different categorizes of real life attack incidents
• Keywords are remote SCADA attacks, delayed SCADA response, insider attacks, infecting
components, injecting malware and etc.
• The connecting words include attack performance, causes and consequence.
3.2.2 Concept Maps on Digital forensics
This section presents three examples of concept maps covering three distinct topics i.e, handling of
the digital evidence, acquisition of evidence and windows registry for investigation.
Handling of digital evidence
Once the evidence is collected from the crime scene protecting the evidence from tampering is
very important. Protecting the evidence is equally important steps as of collecting the evidence.
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Figure 3.4: Attacks on SCADA systems, Real world attacks examples
Handling of evidence involves five stages i.e, storage of evidence, disposition, transporting, doc-
umentation, and packing of evidence. Each step in this process includes further different types
of duties to be performed on evidence collected. Storing of evidence means rules and regulation
imposed like access to storage must be limited and monitored, chain of custody should be main-
tained,login and log out details of who, what, when, where and why. Transporting the evidence
includes protecting portable devices and media from external corruption, determining if computer
should remain powered up,what application were active and other running processes. Where as
documenting the evidence requires where the evidence was found, what state it was in, model num-
ber,serial numbers and time and date if collection. After the investigation is done evidence must
15
Figure 3.5: Different stages of handling a digital evidence
be destroyed or returned.
Steps to develop the Concept Map: Figure 3.5 shows the concept map explaining in detail the
stages included in handling of evidence. The map consists of three levels of hierarchy. The nodes
and connecting links are self explanatory phrases. To develop this map we uses our systematic
approach as follows:
• The targeted concept is the concept of handling of digital evidence.
• Key nodes indicated the actions and duties to be performed in the each individual stages
• connecting nodes indicated the different stages in digital evidence handling
16
Figure 3.6: Different stages in Acquisition of evidence
Acquisition of evidence
In Investigation steps acquisition of the evidence is the first step performed by investigator. Acqui-
sition means collection of digital evidence. This steps includes different methods of providing the
authenticity and integrity of the evidence collected. For instance imaging of the evidence should
be done to preserve original evidence. Usage of write blockers when making copies, file coping and
bit streaming while imaging. Where as documentation includes taking multiple photos and notes
of computer/monitor, crime scene, all devices connected to computer, photos of serial and model
numbers of devices.
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Steps to develop the Concept Map: Figure 3.6 shows the concept map about different phases
of acquisition of evidence. This map consists of four level of hierarchy. The nodes and connecting
links are self explanatory phrases. To develop this map we have used our systematic approach as
follows:
• The targeted concept is the concept of acquisition of evidence
• Key nodes indicated different steps included in collection of digital evidence
• connecting nodes indicated process included in each steps and what it ”indicates”
Windows Registry
While investigating windows registry is a place where investigator get most of the details of system
information, recent activities performed on the systems and information related to the systems
users. There are five main registry hives to store in information on windows machine and they are
security, systems, software, SAM and default. For example system hive contains the information
regarding, computer name, list of USB storage devices, list of printers, CPU information, time zone
information etc. Software hive contains windows version information, last login users details, recent
documents viewed, typed URL’s, list of installed applications etc.
Steps to develop the Concept Map:
Figure 3.7 shows the concept map about windows registry hives and windows registry inves-
tigation. This map is two level of hierarchy. The nodes and connecting links are self explanatory
phrases. To develop this map we have used our systematic approach as follows:
• The targeted concept is the concept of windows register investigation
• Key nodes are ”keys” to find specific detail of the computer for instance active computer
name is system hive
• connecting nodes indicates the hives and database details of windows registry.
3.3 Concept Maps Assessment methods
As mentioned earlier we analyzed the concept maps using two different techniques.
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Figure 3.7: Windows registry investigation
3.3.1 Waterloo Rubric
To assess the context in the concept maps developed we have used the Rubrics (developed by
University of Waterloo) designed for the assessment of the concept maps [2]. The rubric presents
six elements of assessment of a concept map i.e. breadth of net, interconnectedness, use of descriptive
links, efficient links, layout and Development over time. It also suggests to assess these elements
at four levels i.e. Excellent, Good, Poor, and Fail.
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3.3.2 Assessment Parameters
Breadth of net: evaluates the significance of target concepts and their description in multiple
levels. For excellent, a map includes important concepts and describe them in multiple levels.
However, for fail, a map misses many important concepts.
Interconnectedness: evaluates the number of concepts interlinked with other concepts. For
excellent, all concepts are interlinked, and for fail, few concepts are interlinked.
Use of descriptive links: evaluates the quality of description as accurately defined to vague
and incorrectly defined. The first is ranked as excellent while the later is fail.
Efficient links: evaluates the uniqueness of the information of the links and the quality of de-
scription of the relationships among the nodes. For excellent, each link type is distinct and clearly
describes the relationship, while for fail, most links are vaguely described, and not distinct from
each other.
Layout: evaluates the physical layout of a concept map including its size to be fit in one page,
and hierarchical structure. For excellent, maps fit in one page and have clear multiple hierarchy,
while for fail, map consists of multiple pages and has no hierarchical organization.
Development over time: evaluates whether a concept map is built incrementally as the term
progress and new concepts are learned. for excellent, final map shows considerable cognitive pro-
gression from base map and a significantly greater depth of understanding of the domain. while
for fail final map shows no significant cognitive profession from the base map and no increase in
the understanding of the domain.
3.3.3 Assessment Scoring
As mentioned earlier rubric suggest assessment of six important features of concept maps. The
scoring range from 0-4, 0 being the failing concept maps and score for excellent concept maps. Lets
consider and example and go through the process of scoring the map. Figure 3.5 show different
stages of handling the evidence collect. concept maps are manually scored by using rubric.
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Breadth of net: Maps explains all the important ways of handling the evidence. For example it
covers storage of evidence, transportation of evidence, documentation, packing and disposition of
digital evidence. It also explains in details the about the above methods. This parameters score of
4 since the descriptions are in multiple levels
Interconnectedness from figure we can see that all the nodes/concepts are interlinked, all nodes
explains a way to handle the evidence. for instance sub concept transposition of evidence describes
the ways to transport the evidence, like should protect the portable device and and media from
external corruption ans so on. This parameters gets score of 4 since all the concepts are interlinked.
Use of descriptive links in this maps all the links are self explanatory words making it easy to
understand phrases like ”storing the evidence” means how the evidence collected must be stores
how the evidence should be transported ans so on . Thus this parameters gets a score of 4.
Efficient links all the links and nodes are unique and linking phrases clearly explains the relation
of main concept with subconcept. From figure we can see all the nodes/linking phrases are unique,
this parameter gets a score of 4.
Layout we can clearly see that concept maps easy fits into a paper and there are no cycles. All
the nodes are clearly pointing to their subconcept node. This parameter gets score a of 4.
Development over time this parameter explains how well the map can be extended when further
work is done or how easy new subconcept can be added in the cmap. We can see since we have a
sub node of a subconcept it is easy to ass any number of subconcept under the main concept. Thus
this parameter gets a score of 4.
After the above explanation we can see that all the parameters gets a rank of 4 and thus this
concept maps can be scores as excellent quality CMap.
3.3.4 Topological Scoring
To assess the structure of concept map developed we have used topological taxonomy measurement
in cmapanalysis tool. Topological taxonomy measures include the taxonomy score between 0 to 6
where higher score typically indicated higher quality concept maps and higher structural complexity.
This measure also includes the following individual aspects of the concept map that are considered
in calculating the taxonomy score [8]. Cmapanalyis tool can be downloaded from the git respiratory
[1].
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3.3.5 Assessment Parameters
Average Words per Concept: The total count of words, as separated by whitespace, in all
concepts divided by the number of concept in the map. Concise concepts are important to the
taxonomy score.
Branch Point Count: The total number of concepts and linking phrases that have at least one
incoming connection and more than one outgoing connection.
Concept Count: The number of concept in the map.
Linking Phrase Count: The number of linking phrases in the map.
Orphan Count: The number of concepts in the map that have no connections.
Proposition Count: The number of propositions (i.e. concept-linking phrase-concept) in the
map.
Root Child Count: The number of concepts in the map that have an incoming connection from
a root concept. A root concept is defined as one that has outgoing connections but no incoming
connections.
Sub Map Count: The number of root concepts found in the map.
3.3.6 Assessment Scoring
From the above parameters a taxonomy score is computed for the camps. Score indicated that
level 1 cmaps are unevaluated that means maps doesn’t meet the minimum requirement criteria
to be read meaningfully. Rank 2-3 indicated very low level of concept map, level 4 is intermediate
and level 5-6 are high level concept maps. This score is calculated by considered above mentioned
parameters.
CMapAnalysis tool runs the classifier in the following procedure: it iterates through the map
starting from level 0 and check if map belongs to level N if yes then check for level N+1 until the
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highest level is meet. If the condition fails at any level then the map will be classified as N-1 level
map. For instance, for a map at level three following conditions are required. No long concept
labels, No linking-phrases missing, At least 3 branching points and Less than 3 hierarchy levels .
Scoring calculating formulas: concept,labelsize(c) < 12 , linking phrase, label size(l) >0, branching
ponit(m) ≥ 3 here c represent concepts, l represents linking phrases of concept map M
3.4 Analysis of Concept Maps
3.4.1 SCADA Concept Map Assessments
We have developed 22 concept maps for the SCADA security course work. Topics for the concept
map are included from introductory to advance level. These 22 maps developed are divided for
5 different course modules. The distribution of concept maps with respect to their topics are
presented in Table 3.1.
• Introduction to SCADA Systems covers the basic concepts of a SCADA system, and its
components, provides a brief understanding of some physical processes.
• Programming of the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) mainly covers Ladder Logic pro-
gramming including rules to write a program and addressing formats of PLC
• SCADA communication protocols covers two protocols, MODBUS and DNP3 along with there
header and message formats.
• SCADA Vulnerabilities and Attack covers real-world attacks and vulnerabilities discussed in
research document along with attack taxonomies in MODBUS and DNP3 protocols.
• SCADA security solutions covers security solution in SCADA systems like PLC code detec-
tion, smart grid for power stations and smart city application and challenges.
Rubric Results:
Figure 3.8 shows the assessment results we got by using the rubric mentioned earlier, for the
concept maps developed for SCADA security course. From the figure we can see that for the
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Topics # of Concept Maps
Introduction to SCADA Systems 4
PLC Programming 3
SCADA communication protocols 6
SCADA Vulnerabilities and Attack 5
SCADA security solutions 4
TOTAL 22
Table 3.1: Number of concept maps developed for different SCADA security topics
Figure 3.8: Assessment results for SCADA concept maps using Rubric
parameter breadth of net which says about important concept included in the map and description
of domain on multiple level 14 maps are graded to excellent where as 7 maps are good and 1 maps
is poor. For Interconnectedness 8 map are excellent, 12 maps are good and 2 maps is poor. For
use of descriptive links 9 maps are excellent and 13 maps are good. For effective links 7 maps are
excellent , 11 maps are good, 4 maps are failing. For layout 7 maps are excellent 11 maps are good
and 4 maps, 4 maps are poor and so on.
Topological Taxonomy Results:
Figure 3.9 shows the results of assessing the concept map by using cmapanalysis tool again the
topological taxonomy measure. As mentioned earlier this analysis gives a score for structure of
concept map from 0-6, higher the score is means higher quality of concept map. From the figure we
can see that most of the maps have a higher rank in topological taxonomy score. out of 22 maps
8 maps score a rank of 2 and below. where as 14 maps score 3 and above in which 3 maps have
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Figure 3.9: Assessment results for SCADA concept maps using Topological taxonomy
higher rank i.e., sixth and 3 maps score fifth rank.
Rubric evaluation results show that the concept maps comply with the evaluation criteria and
mostly obtain the level of excellent where as in topological taxonomy features evaluation most of
the concept maps and obtain a score of 4-6.
3.4.2 Digital Forensics Concept Map Assessment
We have developed 19 concept maps for digital forensics investigation course work, topics for the
concept maps are included from the introductory topic of investigation to the advance level like
tool used in investigation and file systems. These 19 maps developed are divided into 6 different
course modules. The distribution of the concept maps with respect to their topics are presented in
Table 3.2.
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Topics # of Concept Maps
Introduction to digital forensics 4
First response and evidence handling 2
Investigation steps 3
File systems 5
Memory Forensics 2
Tools for investigation 3
TOTAL 19
Table 3.2: Number of concept maps developed for different digital forensics topics
• Introduction to digital forensics covers concept maps on digital evidence including the where
evidence can be found and types of evidence. Documentation of digital evidence, types of
digital forensics investigation and legal aspects considered for investigating.
• First response and evidence handling covers concept map on how a digital forensics investi-
gator should respond to a case before starting the investigation, what are the necessary steps
and procedures which should be taken care of and how the evidence should be handled.
• Investigation steps this concept map focus on the steps/tasks that should be performed dur-
ing a forensic investigation including the acquisition and analysis of the evidence, and the
reporting that describes the entire investigation procedure and give a conclusion on a case.
• File systems concept map on file system investigation. It provides an overview of different file
system, file allocation table, new technology file system, and investigating tips and techniques
on file system.
• Memory Forensics covers concept maps on memory analysis and live forensics. It explains
volatility data and how important the data is for investigation. These maps also discusses
volatility framework, which is a popular for investigating volatile data. It explains the volatil-
ity plug-ins.
• Tools for investigation concept maps on usage of different tools and techniques for file system
investigation including sleuth kit, windows registry and web browser investigation.
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Figure 3.10: Assessment results for Digital forensics concept maps using Rubric
Rubric Results:
Figure 3.10 shows the assessment results we got by using the rubric, for the concept maps developed
for digital forensics course. From the figure we can see that for breadth of net 13 maps are excellent,
5 maps are good and 1 maps is poor. For Interconnectedness 11 maps are excellent, 7 maps are
good and 1 maps is poor. For use of descriptive links 9 maps are excellent, 8 maps are good and
2 maps are poor. For efficient links 8 maps are excellent, 9 maps are good and 2 maps are poor.
For layout 4 maps are excellent, 14 maps are good, 1 map is poor and so on.
Topological Taxonomy Results:
Figure 3.11 shows the results of assessing the concept map by using cmapanalysis tool again the
topological taxonomy measure. As mentioned earlier this analysis gives a score for structure of
concept map from 0-6, higher the score is means higher quality of concept map. From the figure
we can see that most of the maps have a average rank in topological taxonomy score. Out of 19
maps 9 maps score a rank of 2 and above. Where as other 10 maps have a score of 1. Highest rank
for digital forensics concept maps is 4 which is for the topic of ”report witting of investigation”.
Rubric evaluation results show that the concept maps comply with the evaluation criteria and
mostly obtain the level of excellent where as in topological taxonomy features evaluation most of
the concept maps and obtain a score of 2-5.
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Figure 3.11: Assessment results for Digital forensics concept maps using Topological taxonomy
3.4.3 Waterloo Rubric Vs. Topological taxonomy
As described earlier we have used two assessment methods for evaluating the concept maps devel-
oped. Rubric which defines the correctness and quality of concept maps and topological taxonomy
feature of CmapAnalysis tool which gives the structural level of concept map. Using the rubric
as ground truth we have evaluated the accurately the topological taxonomy feature. Figure 3.12
and 3.13 shows the comparison between the ground truth rubric and topological taxonomy feature
score. We can see from 3.12 for concept maps on attacks on MODBUS, Power grid and real life
attacks both the scoring method evaluate these concept maps as excellent quality maps. For maps
on DNP overview, DNP3 scapy tool results are opposite and where as for other maps we have mixed
results. For figure 3.13 we can clearly see that there is no 100 % accurate result. Further evaluation
on comparison results is needed to see the accuracy level of topological taxonomy feature.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation of Peer Instruction
Peer instruction is a teaching protocol consisting of before-class and in-class activities.
Before class Before-class activities are aimed to have students familiar with the lecture topics
of next class. They include reading material, online videos etc. A quiz is given with the activities
to incentive the students to complete the work.
In class Instructor divides a lecture into a series of peer instruction questions. Each questions
targets a certain concept. The lecture begins with a question. The instructor typically provides 60-
90 seconds to the students to respond to the question and then, allows the students to discuss their
answers with fellow students in small groups. The discussion typically lasts for two to three minutes.
After the discussion, the instructor presents the same question to the students to respond. Clickers
are used to collect the individual responses of the students immediately on instructor’s computer
that summarizes the results. If the answers are incorrect, the instructor may further choose to
discuss the concept, otherwise, can pose the next question.
4.1 Peer Instruction Implementation
Course We choose the introduction to computer security course to evaluate the effectiveness of
peer instruction methodology for cybersecurity education. The course is taught at both undergrad-
uate and graduate levels and provides a broad overview of cybersecurity and covers at least four
cybersecurity areas i.e., user authentication, malicious software, buffer overflow, and cryptographic
tools. The course is offered regularly once or twice in a year as needed.
Instructor The course instructor is an experienced teacher who taught several cybersecurity
graduate and undergraduate courses. He taught the introduction to computer security course five
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Table 4.1: Number of students enrolled in the introduction to computer security course.
Semesters
Undergrad-
uate
Graduate Total
Fall 2015 6 17 23
Fall 2016 13 6 19
Fall 2017 23 10 33
times before implementing the peer instruction in the course. His student evaluations are typically
around 4.5 out of 5.0, which validate the high quality of instruction.
Peer Instruction Activities Recall that peer instruction teaching involves before-class and
in-class activities. For the implementation, the students are given reading assignments to cover
before-class activities. Each assignment expects the students to read a book chapter of the topic
discussed next week in class. The students are given at least one-week time to finish an assignment.
During class, the instructor asks peer instruction questions on a target topic and let students
discuss their answers in small groups (consisting of typically four to five students). Clickers are
used to collect the responses. The instructor also used his lecture slides to discuss the topics as
needed.
4.2 Data Collection
To assess the effectiveness of peer instruction in terms of student failure rate and learning gain,
we develop and utilize four different instruments for data collection i.e., Quiz, Subjective Exam,
Clicker Questions and Survey (refer to Table 4.2 for a summary). Figure 4.1 shows the timeline of
data collection activities in a semester. The semester starts with a before-class reading assignment.
The students are given a week to complete it while the instructor uses this week to discuss the
syllabus, introduce the course activities, go through hands-on assignments, and initiate discussion
on computer security to raise the students’ interest on the subject matter. The rest of the semester
comprises of periodic reading assignments and data collection activities.
We have collected the data for three semesters i.e., Fall 2015, Fall 2016, and Fall 2017. The
first two uses traditional lecture approach while the latter implements peer instruction. Table 4.1
shows the enrollment number of undergraduate and graduate students for these semesters. Unlike
32
Table 4.2: Data collection instruments
Quiz
Ques-
tions
Subjec-
tive
Exams
Clicker
Ques-
tions
Survey
Ques-
tions
29 17 18 19
Table 4.3: Survey on the reasons for enrolling in computer security
Survey Question
Fall
2015
Fall
2016
Fall
2017
Interested in subject matter 96% 90% 88%
Times of class is favorable for
schedule
28% 16% 27%
Other classes wanted were full 9% 26% 30%
Prerequisite for other classes 13% 37% 30%
graduate student population, the undergraduate enrollment increases over the semesters. This
section further describes the data collection instruments.
Quiz Three quizzes are developed to assess the student knowledge on three topics i.e., computer
security overview, user authentication, and cryptographic tools. The students are given (at least
a week) time to prepare for the quizzes after the lectures on the respective topics are completed
in class. The quiz questions are designed to be straight forward with correct set of choices. To
quantify the student responses, each correct question is given one mark.
Subjective Exam The exams are midterm and final tests consisting of subjective questions to
evaluate the understanding of the students on five cybersecurity topics, i.e., computer security
overview, buffer overflow, user authentication, malicious software, and cryptographic tools. The
duration of an exam is one hour and fifteen minutes. The students are advised to provide direct
and concise answers to the questions. The graduate students are expected to answer one additional
question within the allotted time to comply with the university rule. A standard rubric of correct
answers is used to quantify the level of understanding of students on the topics.
Clicker Questions The clicker questions are the peer instruction questions used for the lecture
in class. Clickers are used to record the polls of a question before and after the student discussion
in small groups. The polling results of the questions are an effective means to measure the learning
gains of students at micro-scale as a result of peer discussion. Eighteen questions are used for five
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Table 4.4: Survey on students background and interest in computer security
Survey Question
Fall
2015
Fall
2016
Fall
2017
Previously taken any
coursework related to
computer security
22% 16% 28%
Intend to specialize in
computer security field
48% 63% 49%
Intend to take additional
computer security course
after this class
70% 74% 64%
1st Month 2nd Month 3rd Month 4th Month
Security Overview (R)
Clicker Questions
Quiz 1
User Authentication (R)
Clicker Questions
Quiz 2
Cryptographic Tools (R)
Clicker Questions
Quiz 3
Subjective Exam
Buffer Overflow (R)
Clicker Questions
Malicious Software (R)
Clicker Questions
Survey
Subjective Exam
1
Figure 4.1: Timeline of the data collection using quizzes, survey, subject exams, and clicker ques-
tions. Each box represents a week. ’R’ identifies before-class reading activities on five topics.
topics. Unfortunately, we could not collect the peer instruction data on one topic i.e., security
overview. The other data is collected, analyzed and presented in this document.
Surveys We utilize an attitudinal survey to record the students’ experience and opinions on
clickers and peer instructions. The survey instrument is provided by Beth Simon and Leo Porter
of UC San Diego, and Cynthia Lee of Stanford University. Results from this survey instrument
have been published for numerous peer instruction courses, providing useful comparisons for our
evaluation of peer instruction for cybersecurity (e.g., [19] [26] [27]).
The survey gathers information on prior usage of clickers, course preparation, peer discussion,
clicker usage, and lecture pacing. It contains 19 questions that are designed with a Likert scale.
The survey is given to students at the end of semester in class and provided ample time to complete.
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Figure 4.2: Student dropout rate for peer instruction (Fall 17) and traditional lecture (Fall 16 and
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Figure 4.3: Failure rate in quizzes for peer instruction (Fall 17) and traditional lecture (Fall 16 and
Fall 15) in three cybersecurity topics i.e., security overview, user authentication, and cryptographic
tools at both graduate and undergraduate levels.
Table 4.5: Student Survey on Peer instruction lecture preparation, peer instruction, and clicker
usage
Survey Questions
Aver-
age
Opin-
ion
Thinking about clicker questions on my own, before discussing with people around me, helped
me learn course material.
70%
I read The required material before the lectures. 60%
Most of the time my group actually discussed the clicker question. 87%
Discussing course topics with my seatmate in the class helped me better understand the
course material
77%
The immediate feedback from the clickers helped me focus on weakness in my understanding
of the course
77%
Knowing the right answer is the only important part of the clicker question. 30%
Generally, by the time we finished with a question and discussion, I felt pretty clear about it. 80%
Clickers are an easy-to-use class collaboration tool. 77%
Clickers helped me pay attention in the class compared to traditional lectures 73%
Using clickers with discussion is valuable for my learning. 67%
I recommend that other instructors use this approach (reading quizzes, clickers, in-class
discussion) in their courses.
70%
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Figure 4.4: Failure rate in the subjective exam for five topics i.e., introductory computer security,
user authentication, and cryptographic tools) at both graduate and undergraduate levels in the
peer instruction class (Fall 17) and traditional lecture class (Fall 16 and Fall 15)
4.3 Data Analysis
We analyze the data to measure the effectiveness of peer instruction in terms of dropout and failure
rates, student learning gain during group discussions, and students’ experience on clicker usage and
peer instruction teaching methodology. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarize the students’ background and
interest in computer security. Only 30% students have some prior understanding of cybersecurity.
However, 96% students are interested to learn cybersecurity. Around 75% students intend to take
more cybersecurity courses and 50% would specialize in this area.
4.3.1 Dropout Rate
At the university, the students may drop the course within two weeks after the semester starts
without any official record. After two weeks, the students have six weeks to drop the course with
a ”W” (or Withdraw) grade recorded.
Figure 4.2 shows the dropout rate of the undergraduate students for both traditional lecture
classes conducted in Fall 2015 and Fall 2016, and peer instruction classes in Fall 2017. We notice
that the dropout rate is reduced by 6% and 16% in peer instruction classes at undergraduate level
if compared with Fall 2015 and Fall 2016 respectively. However, the dropout rate for graduate
students does not show any clear improvement for the peer instruction classes.
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Table 4.6: Student survey on peer instruction implementation
From the point of helping me learn, the content of clicker questions was
Much too hard Too hard OK Too easy Much too easy
0% 6.66% 80% 13.33% 0%
In general, the instructor gave us enough time to read and understand the questions before
the first vote.
No, far too little
time
No, too little time OK amount of
time
Yes, too much
time
Yes, far too much
time
0% 0% 80% 13.33% 6.66%
Which of the following best describes your discussion practices in this group?
I always discuss
with the group
around me, it
helps me learn
I always discuss
with the group
around me, I
don’t really learn,
but I stay awake
I sometimes dis-
cuss, it depends
I rarely discuss, I
don’t think I get a
lot out of it
I rarely discuss,
I’m too shy
66.66% 10% 22.33% 0% 0%
The amount of time generally allowed for peer discussion was
Much too short Too short About right Too long Much too long
3.33% 11% 89% 0% 0%
In general, the time allowed for class-wide discussion (after the group vote) was
Much too short Too short About right Too long Much too long
0% 6.66% 70% 23.33% 0%
In general, it was helpful for the instructor to begin class-wide discussion by having students
give an explanation.
N/A - The instructor rarely did
this
It’s not helpful to hear other stu-
dents’ explanations
It was helpful to hear other stu-
dents’ explanations
16.66% 10% 73.33%
The professor explained the value of using clickers in this class.
Not at all Somewhat, but I was
still unclear why we
were doing it
Yes, they explained it
well
Yes, they explained it
too much
0% 10% 83.33% 6.66%
4.3.2 Failure Rate
To measure the students’ performance in the course for both traditional and peer instruction
classes, we obtain failure rate in quizzes and subjective exams. The university policy defines that
the passing grades are A, B, and C and the failing grades are D, and F. If a student scores less than
70% marks, he/she will be considered failed.
Class Quiz Figure 4.3 presents the failure rate of undergraduate and graduate students in quiz
exams for both traditional-lecture (Fall 2015 and Fall 2016) and peer instruction (Fall 2017) classes.
The results show noticeable improvements in the failure rates for peer instruction. In particular,
failure rate of graduate students in user authentication topic is reduced to zero in Fall 2017 from
37
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5 Q 6 Q 7 Q 8 Q 9 Q 10 Q 11 Q 12
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f S
tu
de
nt
s 
W
ho
 A
ns
w
er
ed
 C
or
re
ct
ly
Peer Instruction Questions
Before Discussion After Discussion
Figure 4.5: Percentage of the students who respond to the peer instruction questions correctly
18% and 33% in Fall 2015 and Fall 2016 respectively. The undergraduate students have performed
significantly better in the quiz on cryptographic tools when peer instruction is used. Their failure
rate is reduced by 44% and 37% as compared to Fall 2015 and Fall 2016 respectively.
Subjective Exam Figure 4.4 shows the failure rate of the subjective exams for the five topics
(i.e., computer security overview, buffer overflow, user authentication, malicious software, and
cryptographic tools) taught at both traditional-lecture and peer instruction classes. We notice
substantial improvements in the failure rate for undergraduate students when peer instruction is
used except the cryptographic tools. We reevaluated the student answers of the questions on this
topic. In particular, we found that a significant number of students misunderstood the following
question.
Question on Cryptographic Tools: How can message authentication be achieved using one-way
hash function with 1) Symmetric encryption and 2) Public-key encryption.
Apparently, they ignore the one-way hash function and assume that the question asks about
the symmetric and Public-key encryption schemes. Some students derive message authentication
through encryption without computing and utilizing cryptographic hash values. If the question is
rephrased and restructured, it will likely reduce the failure rate on this topic.
The failure rate for graduate students do not show any clear trend. Overall, we notice that the
peer instruction reduces the failure rate when compared with the traditional lecture classes in Fall
2016. However, it shows no improvement when compared with Fall 2015.
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Figure 4.6: Percentage of the students who respond to the peer instruction questions with the
clicker choices that are not given in the questions
4.3.3 Learning Gain during Group Discussions
Figure 4.5 presents the results of the clicker responses of the students before and after the group
discussions. We notice clear evidence of improvement in the correct answers by the students after
the discussions.
To our surprise, some students chose an option from clickers that were not given in the questions.
In particular, we observed these choices in the questions 4, 7, 11, and 12 on three topics: user
authentication, cryptographic tools, and buffer overflow. Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of the
students who have selected unexpected clicker options. Following is an example of such question.
Question on Buffer Overflow: Which of the following describes a buffer overflow attack?
1. Exploiting the traffic flow mechanism in a buffer and blocking packets from reaching their
destination.
2. Flooding a buffer with server requests and overflowing the network bandwidth.
3. Attempting to store more input in a data holding area than capacity allocates.
4. An attacker fills the target buffer with malicious code
The above question has four choices: A, B, C, and D. However, some students respond with E
from clickers. It shows that these students do not pay attention to the questions. We also notice in
Figure 4.6 that some of these students change their responses after the group discussions, depicting
that they start paying attention during the discussions.
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4.3.4 Survey
Table 4.5 presents the results of the student attitudinal survey portion of the peer instruction
evaluation. It shows that the most of the students find it useful to think about a clicker question
before discussing it with other students and the discussion helps them understand the concept
better. 70% of students would recommend peer instruction be adopted by other instructors.
Table 4.6 summarizes the students opinion about the peer instruction classes. It shows that the
students have a generally positive experience of the classes. They have adequate time to understand
the questions and vote for the correct answer. 80% students agree that the allowable duration for
group discussions is sufficient.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Assessment of Concept Maps
The document presented 41 concept maps useful for improving learning experience of students in
class. We evaluated the quality of the concept maps using two well known techniques for analysis
the structure and contents of concept maps. A well-defined rubric with six elements and four
levels of quality i.e. excellent, good, poor, fail for content. Topological taxonomy features where
the taxonomy score indicates the level of concept map i.e, higher the taxonomy score greater the
structure of concept maps. The evaluation results show that for SCADA security concept maps out
of 22 concept maps 37.12% of Cmaps are of excellent quality and 52.27% of concept maps are good.
For digital forensics concept maps out 19 concept maps 42.9% of CMaps are of excellent quality and
50% of concept maps are good. From topological taxonomy features analysis, for SCADA security,
out of 22 maps 10 concept maps have above average taxonomy score where as for digital forensics
investigation out of 19 maps 9 maps score above average rank.
5.2 Evaluation of Peer Instruction
We implemented and evaluated peer instruction in a semester-long course, introduction to com-
puter security. The evaluation results were compared with traditional lecture classes in terms of
dropout rate, failure rate, and student learning gain. Peer instruction showed promising results for
undergraduate students. Their dropout rate was reduced by by 6% and 16% and failure rate by
44% and 37% when compared with traditional lecture classes of two semesters respectively. The
survey results showed that 77% students found the discussions in small groups useful to understand
the computer security concepts. The overall student experience of peer instruction was positive
and majority students would recommend peer instruction be adopted by other instructors. Unfor-
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tunately, the impact of peer instruction on graduate students is not apparent in evaluation results.
Generally, the existing efforts on peer instruction mostly focused on undergraduate curriculum.
At large, graduate-student is an unknown factor in peer instruction. We suggest and encourage
computing education community to implement and evaluate peer instruction for graduate classes.
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